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Standards of Judicial Review : 
Is it Time to Change our Analysis ? 
Julius H. GREY* 
The notion of a pragmatic and funciionll analysss has become a 
mantra in administrative law, producing three technical standards of re-
view, one of which is selected at the start of virtually every case. All tech-
nical concepss tend to outlive their utility and, it is suggested that the 
current one should now be reconsidered. There is no doubt that courts 
must apply different degrees of judicial deference to various types of de-
cisions. However, just as the old distinciion between judicial and adminis-
trative acts ceased to be helpful in most matters, without ever totally dis-
appearing, the present categories are losing their utility and, if unmodi-
fied, might produce an unduly technical andformalistic system of law. 
It is, in particular, questionabee whether these concepss work well in 
certain specific fields — in disciplinary law, for example and in disputes 
involving fundamental rights. The issue of „expertise" in such matters is 
far from easy and may often generate injustice. 
Le concept de Vanalyse fonctionnelle et pragmatique est devenu un 
rituel en droit administratif et il a produtt trois normes techniquss de ré-
vision, dont l’une est choisie à l’amorce de chaque dossier. Tout concept 
technique tendant à survivre à son utilité, l’auteur suggère que la concep-
tion rettenue doit maintenatt être remise en quesiion. Il ne fait aucun 
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doute que les tribunaux doivent accorder différenss niveaux de déférence 
aux divers organismes décisionnels. Néanmoins, comme l’ancienne dis-
tinction entre un acte administratif et un acte judiciaire n’est plus perti-
nente dans la plupart des cas, sans jamais disparaître complètement, les 
catégories actuelles perdent leur utilité et, si elles devaient demeurer in-
changée,, elles pourraient engendrer un système de droit indûment tech-
nique et formaliste. 
L'application de ces normes techniquss à certains domaines de droit 
est particulièrement discutable, par exemple en droit disciplinarre ou dans 
des dossiers touchant les droits fondamentaux. Dans ces domaine,, la 
question de la « spécialité » d’un organisme est déjà difficlle à traiter et 
elle pourratt facilement donner naissance à de graves injustices. 
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Determining the standard of review or the degree of deference to sub-
ordinate authorities has become a standard preliminary exercise in most 
cases in the field of administrative law1. A special vocabulary has sprung 
up on this issue, including the rather mysterious term “pragmatic and func-
tional analysis”, and three recognized standards have been established by 
the Supreme Court — correctness, unreasonableness and manifest unrea-
sonableness. 
1. This is so despite the disapproval of the use of the terminology of preliminary or 
collateral question in Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 963 v. New Brunswick 
Liquor Corporaiion, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 (hereafter : “CUPE”). Preliminary or collateral 
questions were used for purposes very similar to the standard of review today. 
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In Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 362, McLachlin C.J.C. 
formulated the present theory as follows : 
In order to assess the Board’s decision, we must first determine the appropriate 
standard of review. My colleague LeBel J. in effect questions whether the prag-
matic and functional approach should apply to this case, holding that as an elected 
body, the Board’s decision should be assessed on the basis of whether it is con-
trary to the statute and hence patently unreasonable. In my view, the usual man-
ner of review under the pragmatic and functional approach is necessary. It is now 
settled that all judicial review of administrative decisions should be premised on a 
standard of review arrived at through consideration of the factors stipulated by 
the functional and pragmatic approach. This is essential to ensure that the review-
ing court accords the proper degree of deference to the decision-making body. To 
apply the analysis that my colleague proposes, is first, to adopt an approach for 
which no one argued in this case ; and second, to return to the rigid and sometimes 
artificial jurisdictional approach which the more flexible function and pragmatic 
approach was designed to remedy. 
The pragmatic and functional approach applicable to judicial review allows for 
three standards of review : correctness, patent unreasonableness and an interme-
diate standard of reasonableness. 
The standard of “correctness” involves minimal deference : where it applies, there 
is only one right answer and the administrative body’s decision must reflect it. 
“Patent unreasonableness”, the most deferential standard, permits the decision to 
stand unless it suffers from a defect that is immediately apparent or is so obvious 
that it “demands intervention by the court upon review” : Canadian Union of 
Public Employees Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 
at p. 237. The intermediate standard of “reasonableness” allows for somewhat 
more deference : the decision will not be set aside unless it is based on an error or 
is “not supported by any reasons that can stand up to a somewhat probing exami-
nation” Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 
1 S.C.R. 748, at para. 56 ; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 63 ; 
In the following paragraph, McLachlin C.J.C. deals with the relation-
ship between the concept of “discretion” and deference as though they were 
the same : 
Which of the three standards is appropriate in a given case depends on the amount 
of discretion the legislature conferred on the delegate. The relevant amount of dis-
cretion is evidenced by four factors, which often overlap ; (1) whether the legisla-
tion contains a privative clause (2) the delegate’s relative expertise ; (3) the purpose 
of the particular provision and the legislation as a whole ; and (4) the nature of the 
problem. (See Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 
S.C.R. 557 ; Southam, supra; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982; 
2. Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, 2002 SCC 86 par. 4-6 (hereafter : “Cham-
berlain"). 
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However, while broad discretion certainly does imply relatively little 
judicial review3, the two concepts are somewhat different. All discretion 
necessarily has limits4 and is subject to a variable degree of deference, but 
non-discretionary decisions can also be treated with great respect and ben-
efit from a degree of insulation from review. For instance, jurisdiction is 
not normally a discretionary issue, yet this did not defer Dickson J. from 
saying in CUPL? : 
The courts, in my view, should not be alert to brand as jurisdictional and therefore 
subject to broader curial review, that which may doubtfully be looking so... 
Thus, a degree of deference is imported into an area of law with juris-
diction which was always considered to be the domain “par excellence” of 
the superior courts6. 
The current state of the jurisprudence as stated in the extract from 
Chamberlain1 cited above makes it clear that not all lower court and tribu-
nal decisions can be treated in the same way and lists many of the factors 
which must be taken into account in every case. These things are no longer 
controversial. 
However, a number of serious questions remain about the current 
theory. Firstly, one must look at the criterion used by the courts to deter-
mine standard of review and consider their importance and the possibility 
that there may be other, as yet unformulated ones. Secondly, one must ask 
whether it applies to all judicial review, including review for unfair proce-
3. See J.H. GREY, “Discretion in Administrative Law”, (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. 107. 
See also Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2S.C.R. 817 (hereafter: “Baker”) for a recent statement 
of this correlation. 
4. The classical statement on this topic is found in Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 
121 at p. 140 : “In public regulation of this sort there is no such thing as absolute and 
untrammelled “discretion”, that is that action can be taken on any ground or for any 
reason that can be suggested to the mind of the administrator ; no legislative Act can, 
without express language, be taken to contemplate an unlimited arbitrary power 
exercisable for any purpose, however capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature 
or purpose of the statute. Fraud and corruption in the Commission may not be mentioned 
in such statutes but they are always implied as exceptions. “Discretion” necessarily 
implies good faith in discharging public duty ; there is always a perspective within which 
a statute is intended to operate ; and any clear departure from its lines or objects is just 
as objectionable as fraud or corruption. ” 
5. CUPE, supra, note 1, 233. This is probably the seminal dictum in modern administrative 
law, even if it is not always recognized as such. 
6. See D.P. JONES, Recent Developmenss in Administrative Law, speech to National Admi-
nistrative/Labour and Employment Law Section, Canadian Bar Association, Ottawa, 22 
November 2002 at p. 14 and ff. 
7. Chamberlain, supra, note 2. 
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dure or whether it is limited to the debate about the “reasonableness”, of 
the substantive result in each case. Thirdly, one can question what is left of 
the notion of jurisdiction, which was central to traditional administrative 
law. Finally, and most fundamentally, one must query the continued utility 
of three specific standards of review, when what we seem to have is a spec-
trum going from almost unreviewable to easily reviewable for any error, 
however minor. 
1 The criteria for standard of review 
It is not difficult to list the leading cases dealing with standard of re-
view, even though almost every judicial review case now has a section 
devoted to the issue. 
The leading cases are Pezim v. British Columbia^, Canada v. Southam 
Inc?, Pushpanathan v. Canada10, Baker11, Ivanhoe Inc. v. United Food and 
Commercial Workers Local 500,12 and Chamberlain1^. These cases were 
not revolutionary innovations, but followed from a long line of jurispru-
dence and doctrine dealing with judicial restraint, especially in the field of 
labour relations14. A number of criteria have become standard tests. 
The presence or absence of a privative clause and the wording used 
have been a significant issue since CUPE15. It is clear, however, that the 
presence of a privative clause need not always be decisive against review 
because the decision impugned might be manifestly unreasonable or be-
cause the rest of the context may dictate a lesser standard. Similarly, the 
absence of a privative clause may not be decisive in favour of more gener-
ous curial intervention. In Ivanhoe16, Arbour J. stated this very clearly, 
basing herself on Pushpanathan11 and Pasiechnyk18. 
8. Pezim v. British Columbia, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557 (hereafter: “Pezim”). 
9. Canada v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 745 (hereafter: “Southam”). 
lu. Pushpanathan v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.CK. 982 (hereafter: Pushpanatan ). 
11. Baiter, supra, note 3. 
iz. Ivanhoe Inc. v. United Fooa and Commercial Workers Local JUU, [zuuij 2 S.L,.R. JOJ 
(hereafter: ivanhoe ) . 
13. Chamberlain, supra, note 2. 
14. Canada v. PSAC, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941 ; Blanchard v. Control Data, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 476 
. L J > . L J 
(hereafter: "Blanchard'); CUPE, supra, note 1 ; B. LASKIN, "Certiorari to Labour 
. . . , 
l . v e . e 
. H . Y , ° ^ , . • . , 
y y g . 
15. CUPE, supra, note 1. 
16. Ivanhoe, supra, note 12. 
17. Pushpanathan, supra, note 10. 
1S Pniierhnvk v Snikntrhewnn (Workeri' Comnenintion Hoard] N 997] 2 S C R 890 
17 
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It is significant in Pezim19, Southam00 and Baker21 that considerable 
deference was imposed on tribunals or courts which were exercising pow-
ers of statutory appeal without a privative clause22. It would appear that 
the privative clause issue is not only not decisive, but is perhaps relatively 
unimportant as compared to expertise. 
The primordial significance of expertise is seen in Southam23, where 
Iacobucci J. postulated a great degree of deference to experts, even in situ-
ations where there is no privative clause or, more surprisingly, where there 
is an appeal tribunal and not one performing judicial review. Iacobucci J., 
in this case, was preoccupied not only with the importance of expertise, 
but also with defining the specific field of expertise as well as with the 
subtle notion of “relative expertise”. Even where courts have some argu-
able expertise, they should defer to tribunals with more specialized knowl-
edge. 
Expertise may be a reason for deference because the naming of ex-
perts could be interpreted as a signal from the legislator that judicial review 
is to be restricted. It may also be a ground for restraint because experts 
tend to be more competent than the superior courts in dealing with the tech-
nical issues and the courts are reluctant to impose their views in such cir-
cumstances. Certainly a comparison between the expertise of the Court 
24 
and the lower tribunal is frequently made when considering the standard of 
review  
However, it is far from obvious what constitutes expertise and how 
far it extends. It is no longer clear, as it was in the days ofMcLeodv. Egan25 
that no subordinate body might claim expertise in the interpretation of stat-
utes of general application26. Expertise has become a factor even in the 
interpretation of statutes, especially if the statute is not completely uncon-
nected with the subject matter central to the hearing. 
19. Pezim, supra, note 8. 
20. Southam, supra, note 9. 
21. Baker, supra, note 3. 
zz. See also tsarreau du i^uebec v. Trwunal desprofession,, zuu D.I^.R. (mi) 4/u. 
Li. Southam, supra, note 9, par. I J - I S . On the notion of relative expertise, see Kastner v. 
L.anada (Attorney General), ZUU4 F.L,. 773 (tseaudry J.), a decision of June 4, 
(hereafter: Kastner ) . 
M. cnamoerlain, supra, note 2, par. 10; Jyanaimo (City) v. Rascal Truc/ang Ltd., [zuuuj 1 
S.CK. 342; D.P. JONES, loc. cit., note 6. 
• g , [ J . . . 
26. Pushpanathan, supra, note 10, par. 34. Also see CUPE, supra, note 1. 
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Expertise is a very different concept where the subject matter is not 
accessible to the courts without an expert and where there is nothing eso-
teric about the issues to be decided. For instance, courts have been reluc-
tant to intervene in decisions involving academic evaluation27. How is a 
court to judge the reasonableness of a physics or mathematics thesis28 ? 
Whenever a tribunal possesses the type of knowledge which a court does 
not have, it is a salutory rule to intervene as little as possible, and only 
when the error or injustice is beyond doubt29. However, a “specialized” 
tribunal does not necessarily have inaccessible knowledge when it deals 
with matters like discipline or like refugee status. That is why, in academic 
matters the deference is not nearly as great when discipline or misconduct 
is at stake30. Indeed Kane v. U.B.C?1 is a case dealing with fairness. 
Dickson J enunciated the following general principle which is incompat-
ible with total deference 32 : 
A high standard of justice is required when the right to continue in one’s profes-
sion or employment is at stake. Abbott v. Sullivan, at p. 198 ; Russell v. Duke of 
Norfolk, supra, at p. 119. A disciplinary suspension can have grave and permanent 
consequences upon a professional career. 
The tribunal must listen fairly to both sides, giving the parties to the controversy 
a fair opportunity “for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudi-
cial to their views”. Board of Educaiion v. Rice, at p. 182; Local Government 
Board v. Arlidge, supra at pp. 133 and 141. 
However, disciplinary tribunals, especially in professional law are also 
frequently referred to as having expertise33. Often, the “specialization” in 
such a case is rather a matter of collegiality and self-government than spe-
cialized knowledge34. 
The difference between these concepts of expertise was noted by 
Arbour J. in Moreau-Bérubé v. New Brunswick35. Arbour J. said : 
27. Boyer c. Barreau du Québec, (1993) J.E. 94-88 ; Su c. Foster, [1996] RJ.Q. 170 (Tellier J.). 
28. Of course, a law faculty thesis may be easier for the Court to evaluate but, even then, the 
theory of restraint applies. 
29. Note the stress on knowledge of economics in Southam, supra, note 9. Courts do not 
often have very extensive training or background of this type. 
30. See further Zompa c. Comité de révision des décisions disciplinaires concernant les étu-
diants, [2003] RJ.Q. 509 (Hurtubise J.), under appeal. 
31. Kane v. Universtty of British Columbia, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1105 (hereafter: “Kane”). 
32. Id., 1113. 
33. Barreau du Québec v. T nounal des profession,, note 22. 
y > [ j . . . . 
35. Moreau-Bérubé v. New Brunswtck (Judicial Council), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249 par. 32 
( : ). 
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A tribunal charged with the task of disciplining provincial court judges does not fit 
into the more traditional specialized against non-specialized dichotomy for pur-
poses of evaluating the appropriate standard of review. 
She explains this at greater length36 : 
Thus, in the present case, the purpose and expertise issues present themselves in 
a unique fashion. On the one hand, the Judicial Council is in a sense a highly spe-
cialized tribunal required to deal with constitutionally protected rights — such as 
judicial independence and security of tenure of judges and the right of persons 
who come before the courts to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal—in the overall 
public interest. On the other hand, the tribunal is composed primarily of members 
of the judiciary. This might invite little deference, since, arguably, no more “spe-
cialization” exists in the judges sitting as Council members than in their colleagues 
sitting in court. The idea that specialization leads to deference is based on the more 
typical scenario, where a tribunal is composed of people who are not judges and 
who have a specialized expertise superior to that of judges who are, on the whole 
generalists. 
In short, the issue here is not specialized knowledge, but the special-
ized funciions and the presumed intention of the legislator. However 
Arbour J. went on to connect this type of “specialized function” with the 
more traditional expertise37. She then imposed a high standard of defer-
36. Id., par. 22-34. The issue of “peer” review as related to the expertise is directly brought 
up in Therrien (Re), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 3 (hereafter : “Therrien”) at par. 148 ; this is textually 
cited at par. 38 of Moreau-Bérubé : “the legislature has chosen to assign the important 
responsibility of determining whether the conduct of a provincial court judge warrants a 
recommendation for removal from office exclusively to the Court of Appeal, under s. 95 
CJ.A. This is a very special role, perhaps a unique one, in terms of both the disciplinary 
process and the principles of judicial independence that our Constitution protects. 
Accordingly, this Court should only review the assessment made by the Court of Appeal 
if it is clearly in error or seriously unfair.” 
37. Moreau-Bérubé, supra, note 35, par. 36-37 : “The Council also has in fact a certain degree 
of specialization over that of the reviewing court. Gonthier J. noted in Therrien, supra at 
para. 147 (with reference to the Friedland Report, supra, a tp . 80-81), that “before making 
a recommendation that a judge be removed, the question to be asked is whether the 
conduct for which he or she is blamed is so manifestly and totally contrary to the 
impartiality, integrity and independence of the judiciary that the confidence of 
individuals appearing before the judge, or of the public in its justice system, would be 
undermined, rendering the judge incapable of performing the duties of his office”. In 
making such a determination, issues surrounding bias, apprehension of bias, and public 
perceptions of bias all require close consideration, all with simultaneous attention to the 
principle of judicial independence. This, according to Gonthier J., creates “a very special 
role, perhaps a unique one, in terms of both the disciplinary process and the principles of 
judicial independence that our Constitution protects” (para. 148). Although this is clearly 
not the type of tribunal that develops an expertise from the sheer volume of cases before 
it the fact that the Council is engaged in this special and unique role gives it some degree 
of specialty not enjoyed by ordinary courts of review who have never historically been 
involved in such matters ” 
J.H. GREY Standards of Judicial Review... 549 
ence on the basis of the purpose and function of the lower tribunal ; she 
treats it not necessarily as having greater specialization than the Courts but 
as having “equal or better qualifications”. Thus, special functions may be 
as important as special knowledge in promoting deference. 
What is often overlooked, however, is the danger lurking in peer re-
view and indeed in excessive respect for expertise. Peer review is not an 
unmixed blessing. It is part of the human condition that minority schools 
of thought are often victims of injustice, that many are fearful or envious 
of those who might seem better then they are or who challenge their au-
thority. It is not an accident that our legal tradition settled for a “general-
ist” superior court as an ultimate arbiter, not a plethora of specialized 
tribunals. It is not an accident, either, that despite all the pronouncements 
about deference, litigation in the academic and the professional spheres 
continues unabated. Our belief in peer review is often rooted in a narrow 
assumption of constant good faith which unfortunately is sometimes lack-
ing38. 
Technical expertise has its downside as well, despite its undoubted 
utility and indeed necessity. An expert can hardly have the detachment and 
the neutrality with respect to his discipline that a less committed judge will 
often display. It would be difficult to respect an “expert” who after years of 
intensive work in a field of human endeavour had no strong feelings about 
any controversy in that field. A reading of jurisprudence will show us how 
often experts disagree, how such expertise is sometimes a matter of the use 
of language, and how regularly a court will reject an expert’s views. Obvi-
ously, a court would be foolhardy to disregard expert views when they are 
not in a position to check the expert’s analysis through other expert assis-
tance. However a certain degree of scepticism side by side with respect 
and deference would probably improve the quality of justice39. 
A third type of expertise, in addition to technical knowledge and “peer 
autonomy” in what may be called “political expertise” where those making 
the decisions are elected and thus presumably invested with the majority’s 
mandate40. In Chamberlain*1 we see that a school board is seen as being 
38. Ritchie J.’s dissent in Kane, supra, note 31, was an example of this narrow assumption. 
Fortunately, the majority of the Court did not follow him. 
39. For instance, this writer remains firmly convinced that despite the interesting analysis 
found in those cases, both Moreau-Bérubé, supra, note 35, and Therrien, supra, note 36, 
were wrongly decided and should be reconsidered by the Supreme Court. 
40. Deference to parliament or to provincial assemblies would be an illustration of this. 
41. Chamberlain, supra, note 2, par. 10. 
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more appropriate to determine the preoccupation of the collectivity than 
courts. This is perhaps in order to preserve the non-political nature of 
courts. 
Whenever deference is invoked with respect to municipal by-laws, 
school-board decisions, or indeed laws of general application, this broad 
discretion of persons elected to office must be weighed against the dangers 
represented by majorities and the many ways in which our society has 
adopted to protect citizens against majorities and unbridled populism, of 
which the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and similar provin-
cial Charters are undoubtedly the best example. 
As Chamberlain42makes clear the issue of “expertise” must be evalu-
ated with respect not only to the tribunal as such, but with respect to each 
question before it. Moreover, no matter what the expertise of the tribunal, 
decisions which touch fundamental human rights should not be treated with 
great deference. In Chamberlain, we see this stated explicitly ; however 
even in the field of human rights, different types of issues require different 
degrees of deference. Nevertheless, the entire field of fundamental rights is 
seen as having a particularly “judicial” character. 
Human rights trump other considerations and, moreover, are singu-
larly unsuitable for decisions by majorities since constitutional protections 
are often intended to shield citizens from majority opinion. It follows that 
the more one can present a case as one of basic rights or freedoms, the less 
difficult will it be to obtain judicial redress, if the Court disagrees with the 
original decision-maker. Further, and with the possible exception of hu-
man rights tribunals, subordinate bodies will not be successful in asserting 
claims to greater expertise in human rights than the reviewing courts. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has insisted that lower tribunals 
and, in particular, labour arbitrators should be able to apply the various 
charters of law and the Superior Court should not use its supervising pow-
ers so as to preclude them from doing so in advance43. Chamberlain44 and 
other similar judgments will palliate this to a considerable degree by mak-
ing judicial review relatively easy in such matters. In short, the arbitrators 
will make a first decision, but it will be set aside if the courts disagree with-
out a requirement of unreasonableness ; 
42. Id., par. 9. See also Pushpanathan, supra, note 10, par. 33, and Barrie Public Utilities v. 
Canadian Cable Television Association, 2003 SCC 28. 
43. See for instance : Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929 ; Regina Police Associa-
tion Inc. v. Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioners, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 360. 
44. Chamberlain, supra, note 2, par. 10. 
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It is likely, too, that decisions involving constitutional law or other 
matters of great public importance will be reviewed with relative alacrity. 
Courts are unlikely to abdicate their stewardship of the constitution. 
The two remaining criteria stipulated in Pushpanathan45 and Cham-
berlain46, the purpose of the act as a whole and of the impugned provision 
in particular and the “nature of the problem” are variations on the same 
themes. In Pushpanathan41 we read that there is a connection between the 
purpose of a statute and the expertise of the decision-makers created un-
der it. 
The purpose of an enactment is in any event a very significant factor 
in its interpretation48 and it is discovered by taking into account virtually 
every type of consideration. In judicial review, the expertise of the subor-
dinate tribunal is simply one of the major factors. 
The fourth criterion — the nature of the problem and whether the is-
sue is one of fact or law — is also related to the expertise. However, certain 
very specific questions arise, and, in particular, the difficulty of determin-
ing what is fact and what is law. 
In Canada v. Mossop49, L’Heureux-Dubé J. said : 
In general, deference is given on questions of fact because of the “signal advan-
tage” enjoyed by the primary finder of fact. Less deference is warranted on ques-
tions of law, in part because the finder of fact may not have developed any 
particular familiarity with issues of law. While there is merit in the distinction 
between fact and law, the distinction is not always so clear. Specialized boards are 
often called upon to make difficult findings of both fact and law. In some circum-
stances, the two are inextricably linked. Further, the “correct” interpretation of a 
term may be dictated by the mandate of the board and by the coherent body of 
jurisprudence it has developed. In some cases, even where courts might not agree 
with a given interpretation, the integrity of certain administrative processes may 
demand that deference be shown to that interpretation of law. 
Pushpanathan50 further added that no clear line can be drawn between 
fact and law and that many questions are a mixture of fact and law. 
45. Pushpanathan, supra, note 10. 
46. Chamberlain, supra, note 2. 
47. Pushpanathan, supra, note 10, par. 31 et 36. 
48. See Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouvrr (City), [1994] 1 S.CK. 231 and Re Multi-
malls Inc. et al. and Minister of Transportation and Communications et al., (1977) 14 
O.R. 2d 49 (Ont. CA.). The purpose of an enactment is important both in private and in 
public law. 
49. Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, 594-600. Cited in extenso in 
Pushpanathan, supra, note 10. See also Kastne,, supra, note 23, on this point. 
50. Pushpanathan, supra, note 10, par. 33. 
552 Les Cahiers de Droit (2004) 45 c. de D. 545 
These difficulties are not limited to judicial review or to statutory ap-
peals like classes in Southam51. In the ordinary courts, appellate instances 
are reluctant to set aside findings of fact or credibility52. It is a compelling 
argument against intervention, that the judge who saw witnesses is in a 
better position to determine facts and credibility than one who merely reads 
a transcript53. This argument is conceptually similar to the claim that an 
expert can better decide a point than a generalist. Moreover, the non-ver-
bal factors in determining credibility can be very significant and, without a 
video an appellate court has no access to them. 
The classical explanation of the difference between judicial review and 
appeal is that in appeal the court may substitute its opinions while in judi-
cial review it only determines the “legality” of the decision. Given the stan-
dard of review and the considerable deference manifested by appellate 
courts, the difference is far less evident in practise than in theory. 
While the Supreme Court has consistently applied the above four cri-
teria and pointed out how much they overlap, its language made it clear 
that there is an infinite number of other issues, which might affect the stan-
dard of review in any given case. These issues are, like the four “official 
ones”, necessarily inter-connected. They include the importance of the 
question and its precedential value54. The degree of injustice resulting from 
failure to review is also a factor55, although often instead of lowering the 
standard of review, the courts might simply find that a strikingly unjust 
decision is manifestly unreasonable56. 
51. Southam, supra, note 9. 
52. See: Fletcher v. Manitoba Public Insurance Company, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 191 ; Bank of 
Montreal v. Bail Ltée, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 554. 
53. The deference disappears or is substantially attenuated when the appeal court hears 
witnesses D’Artagnan v. R., [1978] C.A. 172. 
54. See Ivanhoe, supra, note 12. See especially Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons 
of British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226 (hereafter : “Dr. Q”) where we read at par. 34 : 
“My colleague LeBel J. discusses at length our jurisprudence on standards of review. He 
reviews concerns and criticisms about the three standard system of judicial review. 
Given that these issues were not argued before us in this case, and without the benefit of 
a full adversarial debate, I would not wish to comment on the desirability of a departure 
from our recently affirmed framework for standards of review analysis. (See this Court’s 
unanimous decisions of Dr. Q. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Colum-
bia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19 ; and Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, 
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20.)” 
55. The celebrated case Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Tribunal ex parte Shaw, 
[1951] 1 K.B. 711, was surely decided largely because of flagrant injustice. 
56. As in : Stein v. A.G. Que., [1999] R.J.Q. 2416 ; Boussetta v. Corporaiion professionnelle 
des médecins, S.CM. 500-05-014449-885, not reported (Tannenbaum J.). 
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We should underestimate the importance of the “spirit of the times” or 
the type of results which are considered reasonable in each epoch in deci-
sions on judicial review. Deference and judicial activism are not new con-
cepts at all, but in each period, they apply to different things57. For instance, 
interventionism favourable to the employer, was the rule in labour rela-
tions for many decades58. Today, labour law is the area where judicial re-
straint is most in vogue59. On the other hand, it is unlikely that a court in 
the 1950s would have been as open to review in carceral law, immigration 
law or other areas involving individual rights as today’s courts60. In short, 
it is very possible that, in another period, the results of Southam61, 
Pushpanathan62 and Chamberlain63 would have been reversed, not because 
there is more or less deference in our times, but because the deference is 
reserved for different issues. 
There is thus no doubt that different standards of review are applied 
and no doubt that the criteria set out by the Supreme Court are the most 
significant at present. On the other hand, this is no easy formula and the 
words “pragmatic and functional” do not change the open-ended, subjec-
tive and constantly evolving nature of the classification. 
2 Do standards of review apply to all questions in the realm of judicial 
review law or only to the concept of the “unreasonable decision” ? 
At one time, it appeared that judicial review was available only to 
matters of jurisdiction in the strict sense, such as constitutional questions 
or to the procedure in quasi-judicial matters64. Dicta abounded which de-
nied judicial review on all matters of substance. This was obviously unsat-
isfactory, both because it made it possible to evade review by scrupulous, 
if dishonest observance of procedure and because it was very difficult to 
draw a line between questions with a jurisdictional dimension and those 
without one. Some form of review of substance became essential65. 
57. See J.H. GREY, loc. cit., note 14. 
jo. B. LASKIN, loc. cit,, note 14. 
59. Ivanhoe, supra, note 12 ; Canada (Labour Relaiions Board) v. International 
Longshoremen's Association, local 269, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 245. 
60. Today’s courts, it must be stated, have the Charter and other human rights instruments 
to assist them. 
61. Southam, supra, note 9. 
62. Pushpanathan, supra, note 10. 
c r y , I . . . 3 
( . . . ) . y, . q 
{J\0. 2.), [iy»UJ 1 S.L,.R. ÖUZ. 
65. See J.H. GREY, "Can Fairness be Effective ?", (1982) McGill L. J. 360. 
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It was established in the 1980s that unreasonable decisions both in fact 
and law are subject to review66. The different standards of review and the 
establishment of relative judicial restraint evolved in response to this de-
velopment. One can thus view this development as more of a broadening 
and then a narrowing of the scope of judicial review, despite the preva-
lence of restrictive language. Before 1980, many of the applications for re-
view that are now dismissed after a lengthy discussion of standards of 
review would have been peremptorily thrown out as “unreviewable”. 
However, many cases discuss standards of review as a matter of 
course even if the issue of unreasonableness is absent. Moreover, CUPE67 
has taught us that “jurisdictional” is neither a clear concept nor one uncon-
nected with judicial restraint and deference to specialized decision-mak-
ers. Therefore the precise area to which the standards of review must be 
applied is often difficult to determine ; 
However, it cannot be maintained that, in a clear case of ultra vires, 
one need worry about standard of review68. On matters of natural justice 
Moreau-Bérubé69 would seem to have settled the issue, with the words of 
Arbour J. at par. 74 where she explicitly excluded issues of natural justice 
from the jurisprudence on standards of review. 
As usual, what appears categorical and clear, is less so after analysis. 
If standards of review form no part of natural justice and fairness which, 
after Cardinal and Oswald v. Director of Kent Instituiion , always give 
66. Blanchard, supra, note 14 ; Miriam Homes v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (Lo-
cal 211), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 137. See also J.H. GREY and L.-M. CASGRAIN, “Jurisdiction, 
Fairness and Reasonableness”, (1988) Dalhousie Law Journal, Vol. 10, no. 3, January 
1987. 
67. CUPE, supra, note 1. 
68. See Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), supra, note 50 ; Salomon c. Bar-
reau du Québec, 500-09-008571-994 (CA.). 
69. Moreau-Bérubé, supra, note 35, par. 74. 
70. Cardinal and Oswald v. Director of Kent Instituiion, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 (hereafter: 
''Cardinal and Oswald”) where Le Dain J. said at para. 14 : “This Court has affirmed that 
there is, as a general common law principle, a duty of procedural fairness lying on every 
public authority making an administrative decision which is not of a legislative nature 
and which affects the rights, privileges or interests of an individual : Nicholson v. 
Halimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311; 
Martineau v. Matsqui Instituiion Disciplinary Board (No. 2), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602 ; Attor-
ney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735. In Martineau 
(No. 2), supra, the Court held that the duty of procedural fairness applied in principle to 
disciplinary proceedings within a penitentiary. Although administrative segregation is 
distinguished from punitive or disciplinary segregation under s. 40 of the Penitentiary 
Service Regulation,, its effect on the inmate in either case is the same and is such as to 
give rise to a duty to act fairly.” 
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rise to review if violated, it is also true that there are different standards of 
fairness applied in administrative law71. In Canada, the definitive judgment 
is still that of Dickson J. in Coopers and Lybrand22 where we read : 
Administrative decision does not lend itself to rigid classification of function. In-
stead, one finds realistically a continuum. As paradigms, at one end of the spec-
trum are rent tribunals, labour boards and the like, the decisions of which are 
eligible for review. At the other end are such matters as the appointment of the 
head of a Crown corporation, or the decision to purchase a battleship, determina-
tion inappropriate to judicial intervention. The examples at either end of the spec-
trum are easy to resolve, but as one approaches the middle the task becomes less 
so. One must weigh the factors for and against the conclusion that the decision 
must be made on a judicial basis. Reasonable men balancing the same factors may 
differ, but this does not connote uncertainty or ad hoc adjudication ; it merely re-
flects the myriad administrative decision-making situations which may be encoun-
tered to which the reasonably well-defined principles must be applied. 
This spectrum is not very different from the standards of review. 
Moreover, the criteria are very similar. Baker73 deals both with natural jus-
tice in the form of bias and with unreasonable decisions, but does not ap-
proach the two differently as to the deference due to immigration officers. 
In other words, the greater the discretion, the less the involvement of fun-
damental rights74, the greater the technical specialization of the tribunal, 
the less available is judicial review both for procedure and substance75. 
What clearly cannot be injected into natural justice following Moreau-
Bérubé76 is the three technical standards used for reasonableness. The is-
sue of degree of review and of restraint is present nonetheless. 
3 What is left of jurisdiction ? 
Jurisdiction used to be the central concept of administrative law, so 
much so that, even in matters of “natural justice” the language of jurisdic-
tion was used to justify curial intervention77. 
71. Quebec (Labour Relations Board) v. Canadian Ingersol--Radd Co. Ltd., [1968] S.C.R. 
695, which stated that an oral hearing is not always available; see also C.C.S.U. v. 
Minister for Civil Service (H.L.(E.j), [1985] 1 A.C. 374. 
72. Canada (Minister or National Revenue) v. Coopers and Lybrand Ltd., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 
495, 505 (hereafter : “Coopers and Lybrand”). 
73. Baker, supra, note 3. 
74. For instance, Beetz J. connected fundamental rights and the need for an oral hearing in 
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177. 
75. It is, however, possible that a privative clause has less effect in the case of unfair 
procedure. 
76. Moreau-Bérubé, supra, note 35. 
77. Amsmimc Ltd. v. The Foreign Compensation Minister and another, [1969] 1 All E.R. 208. 
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In Canada the use of jurisdiction for virtually all kinds of reviewable 
error ceased to make sense after Harelkin1,, where errors as to natural jus-
tice were held to be voidable rather than void. Truly jurisdictional errors 
now refer to lack of initial jurisdiction, not of its loss through unfairness or 
unreasonable review. 
At about the same time as Harelkin19, CUPE0 pointed out that 
whether or not something is jurisdictional is often a debatable matter, and 
the opinion of the specialized decision-maker should be given some weight 
on this issue. However, nothing has ever supplanted Beetz J.’s statement 
in Re Syndicat des Employés de produciion du Québec et de l’Acadie and 
Canada Labour Relations Board v. C.L.R.B.81 that once a question has 
been classified as jurisdictional, the courts will review all errors, even “rea-
sonable” ones. 
Some ultimate residue must remain in the old concept of jurisdiction 
for a number of reasons. First of all, jurisdiction is part of constitutional 
law as well as administrative law and it is surely unthinkable to apply “stan-
dards of review” to the division of power. The court must decide whether 
the authority in question acted intra vires or ultra vires and an excess of 
power of this kind must be struck down without deference. 
It cannot however be gainsaid that there is much less litigation about 
the division of power than there was in the days when the Privy Council 
was the ultimate tribunal82. The Supreme Court of Canada has tended, with 
a few well-known exceptions to permit parallel federal and provincial leg-
islation with federal predominance. 
In the same vein, judicial review for excess of jurisdiction is to a cer-
tain degree constitutionally guaranteed83. However we may attenuate the 
concept, something of it must remain. 
78. Harelkin v. U. of Regina, [1979] 2 S.CR. 561. 
79. Ibid. 
80. CUPE, supra, note 1. 
81. Re Syndicat des Employés de produciion du Québec et de l Acadie and Canada Labour 
Relations Board v. C.L.R.B (1984) 14 D.L.R. (4th) 45 7 at p. 479-480. 
82. See, however, Attorney General of Quebec v. Attorney General of Canada (In the matter 
of the reference regarding the constitutionality of Sections 22 and 23 of the Employment 
Insurance Act), RfcJB 2004-52999. 
83. Crevier v. Québec (Attorney General), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220. 
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In Stinchcomee v. Law Society of Alberta^, the Alberta Court of 
Appeal said : 
With respect to the jurisdiction issue, the Chambers Judge was required to apply 
a standard of correctness : Dickson v. Universtty of Alberta, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103 
(SCC) ; Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554. If the Com-
mittee was not properly constituted under the governing legislation, it had no ju-
risdiction to proceed with a hearing into the Charges. 
It would follow that there still exists a fairly narrow category of mat-
ters where the notion of jurisdiction dictates judicial review on the basis of 
correctness and where there can be no deference to the original decision-
maker85. 
4 Are the three standards of review still useful ? 
It might appear bold to question the utility of the three standards of 
review when the Supreme Court and all other courts discuss them con-
stantly. Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the three 
standards are now little more than a formula which can at times obscure 
the real issues, however “functionally or pragmatically” one applies them. 
84. Stinchcombe v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] A.J. 544, par. 30. See also Barrie Public 
Utilities v. Canadian Cable Television Association, supra, note 42. However, the recent 
decision of Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.) v. Ontario (Minister of 
Labour), 2003 SCC 29, appears to apply the notion of standard of review to decisions 
involving the independence of the judiciary, which is a constitutional matter. It found 
the nomination to be manifestly unreasonable and set it aside. 
85. The limited utility of such concepts as jurisdiction was reaffirmed, although weakly, by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Dr. Q, supra, note 54, where we read at par. 24 : “Just as 
the categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule may converge with the result reached by 
the Smith analysis, the categorical and nominate approaches to judicial review may 
conform to the result of a pragmatic and functional analysis. For this reason, the wisdom 
of past administrative law jurisprudence need not be wholly discarded. For example, in 
Bakerv. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigraiion,, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, L’Heu-
reux-Dubé J. invoked the old Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury 
Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (C.A.), categorical approach to discretionary decisions as a 
reflection that ministerial decisions have classically been afforded a high degree of 
deference (see also Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 
1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1, at paras. 29-30), but acknowledged that the principled approach 
must now prevail. Similarly as Binnie J. recognized in Mount Sinai Hospital Centre v. 
Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281 2001 SCC 41 at 
para. 54 that under the pragmatic and functional approach even “the review for abuse 
of discretion may in principle range from correctness through unreasonableness to pa-
tent unreasonableness" The nominate grounds language of jurisdiction and ossified 
interpretations of statutory formulae while still useful as familiar landmarks no longer 
dictate the journev ” 
558 Les Cahiers de Droit (2004) 45 c. de D. 545 
There is of course no doubt possible that there exist different degrees 
of deference applied to Tribunals and to decisions, depending largely on 
the criteria set out by the Supreme Court in defining the three standards. 
There is also no doubt that the court has tried to close the door for 
new standards. In Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryarfi6, Iacobucci J. 
said : 
In the Court’s jurisprudence, only three standards of review have been defined for 
judicial review of administrative action (Chamberlain v. Surrey School District 
No. 36,2002 SCC 86, at para. 5, per McLachlin C.J. ; Baker v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 55 ; see also Pezim v. 
British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557, at p. 589-590 ; 
Canada (Director of Investigation and Research,, v. SouthamInc, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 
748, at para. 30 ; Pushpanathan, supra, at para. 27. The pragmatic and functional 
approach set out in Bibeault, supra, and more recently in Pushpanathan, supra, 
will determine, in each case, which of these three standards is appropriate. I find 
it difficult, if not impracticable to conceive more than three standards of review. 
In any case, additional standards should not be developed unless there are ques-
tions of judicial review to which the three existing standards are obviously un-
suited. 
Save for the reservation contained in the last sentence, this is quite 
categoric. It is even more difficult to challenge when one adds the two para-
graphs which follow87 in which Iacobucci J. explains that one of the pur-
poses of restricting the number of standards is to avoid technical or 
unavoidable distinctions. 
At first glance, the court is as closed to an argument that the standards 
are merely a spectrum, as it is to a multiplicity of standards. Iacobucci J. 
responds to the spectrum argument as follows88 : 
This argument must be rejected. If it is inappropriate to add a fourth standard to 
the three already identified, it would be even more problematic to create an infi-
nite number of standards in practice by imagining that reasonableness can float 
along a spectrum of deference such that it is sometimes quite close to correctness 
and sometimes quite close to patent unreasonableness. This argument rests on a 
mistaken extension of the metaphor of a spectrum. 
But soon it became clear that it is not the spectrum which is rejected, 
but, once again, the notion of new and different standards of review. Para. 
45 makes this clear89 because Iacobucci J. is willing to accept a spectrum of 
deference only no spectrum of standards. 
86. Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, par. 24 (hereafter : “Ryan”). 
87. Id., par. 25, 26. 
88. Id., par. 44. 
, par. 
J.H. GREY Standards of Judicial Review... 559 
The spectrum is still useful to show that the degree of deference varies 
inside each of the three standards, not with respect to the definition or the 
criteria used, but with respect to the result90. 
The issue of “spectrum” arose once before in the history of judicial 
review. In the 1960s and 1970s, the distinction between “administrative” 
and “quasi-judicial” was becoming as sacramental a formula as the three 
standards and far more abusive. According to this, those quasi-judicial 
decisions were reviewable for natural justice and administrative ones were 
not91. It is to get around this distinction that the courts created a third stan-
dard fairness, which arguably was intended as a “half-way house” between 
the two concepts92. Gradually93, the utility of determining in each case 
whether fairness or full natural justice applied, came to be questioned. In 
Coopers and Lybrand94, the spectrum theory was adopted in the celebrated 
paragraph quoted in extenso at footnote 74, supra ; 
Similarly, in St-Hilaire v. Bégin95, L’Heureux-Dubé J.A. doubts the 
utility of any further distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial 
functions in the light of the new flexibility. 
Not that completely new standards were intended or that all reference 
to quasi-judicial or administrative disappeared96 or became heretical. 
Rather, judges no longer needed to refer to the standard just as a practised 
violinist no longer needs frets. This result was definitively formulated in 
Cardinal and Oswald97 and procedural fairness ceased to be a major preoc-
cupation as a theoretical issue in administrative law98. Instead attention 
90. Id., par. 46. Perhaps this is the ultimate sense to be given to the words “pragmatic and 
functional”. The result is often a matter of common sense, not learned analysis. 
91. See : The King v. Electrictty Commissioners, [1924] 1 K.B. 171 ; Nakkuda Ali v. M.F. De 
Jayarathe, [1951] A.C. 66 ; Martineau v. Matsqui Instituiion (No. 1), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 118. 
The most extreme expression of this view is found in the Federal Court of Appeal 
decision of Martineau v. Matsqui Instituiion (No. 2), (1978) 40 C.C.C. (2d) 325 (F.C A.), 
fortunately overturned in Martineau v. Matsqui Instituiion (No. 2), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602. 
92. This is the expression used by Laskin J. in Nicholson v. Haldimand Norfolk Regional 
Board of Commissioners of Police, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311. It is also implicit in: Ridge v. 
Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40 ; Re H.K.(An Infant), [1967] 2 Q.B. 617 ; and Canada (Minister 
of Manpower and Immigraiion) M.M.I. v. Hardaya,, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 470. 
93. Starting perhaps with Wiseman v. Borneman, [1969] 3 All E.R. 275. 
94. Coopers and Lybrand, supra, note 72. 
95. St-tluaire v. Bégin, [1982] CA. 25. 
96. See J.H. GREY and L.-M. CASGRAIN, loc. cit., note 66. 
97. Cardinal and Oswald, supra, note 70. 
, • . . . . . . 
98. Although its application continued to generate considerable îunsprudence. See Univer-
•; 
sité du Québec à Trois-Rivieres v. Larocque, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 471 and Baker, supra, note 3. 
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turned to review of substance and therefore to the degree of deference to 
be given to decisions on the merits. This is the debate which spawned the 
three standards of review. 
In Dr. Q." and Ryan100, the Supreme Court treats the matter as defini-
tively settled, yet it keeps coming back several times every year. The appli-
cation is not nearly as settled as the theory. 
The possibility of a total review of the theory of standards of review 
has now been confirmed dramatically in Toronto v. CUPE101. 
Mr. Justice Lebel, speaking for a concurring minority raised doubts 
about the entire scheme of review. He questioned102 whether the distinc-
tion between patent unreasonableness and unreasonableness simpliciter 
has much rational or easily definable basis. He reserved for the future any 
jurisprudential change made necessary by his conclusions. 
He ended his judgment with what was essentially a question103. This 
was natural because the majority chose not to debate standards of review. 
However, the terms used by Arbour J. also seem to presage a coming modi-
fication of the current dogma concerning standards and a departure from 
the prevailing rigidity and formality. Such a modification will be a welcome 
development. 
Mr. Justice LeBel continued his philosophical queries in another con-
curring judgment104 in which he put in doubt the distinction between mani-
festly unreasonable decisions and merely unreasonable ones. He sought to 
restore the clarity and elegance of Dickson, J’s decision, CUPE V. New 
Brunswick Liquor Corp.105. This decision was also applied by McLachlin 
CJC in Chamberlain106. This later, unusually brief decision makes it very 
clear that a significant review of administrative law terminology and sub-
stance is needed, in the interest of simplicity and transparency. 
As with fairness, it is impossible to imagine an end to litigation as to 
the details. Indeed, in all areas of law, litigation continues even if the basic 
principles of law are established. However, the theoretical argument would 
99. Dr. Q., supra, note 54. 
100. Ryan, supra, note 88. 
101. Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.r.L.), [ZOOJJ 3 îi.C.R. 77. 
iuz. ia., par. 44. 
103. Id., par. 78. 
104. Voice Construction Ltd. v. Construction & General Workers' Union, Local 92, 2004 
105. CUPE, supra, note 1. 
106. Chamberlain, supra, note 2. 
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become less common if, as after Coopers and Lybrand101 in the case of 
fairness, less attention was paid to the standards and more to the particular 
situation in each case. Law has been plagued by technicalities and pica-
yune distinctions and lawyers have often been in ill repute because of them. 
Technicalities can only be tolerated so long as they are useful in explaining 
concepts or resolving disputes. Indeed, the most fundamental technical 
rules have a history of sudden and sweeping reversal and, if this were not 
so, the common law would have ceased to evolve centuries ago. It is sub-
mitted that the theoretical arguments on standards of review have ceased 
to be useful or fruitful and that public law should move to other issues108. 
At all times one must strive to maintain justice and fairness in the re-
sult. It does not enhance the reputation of the legal system when absurd or 
oppressive results are attained through technical analysis. Nor does it au-
gur well for a legal system if the superior courts invoke deference to aban-
don their duty of supervising the application of fundamental questions of 
law109. 
107. Coopers and Lybrand, supra, note 72. 
108. A few questions — the independence of decision makers, the deference to state security, 
the limits of discretion, and administrative law and the Charter are becoming very rele-
vant in our times and may indicate the future of public law. It is also evident that a 
number of substantive areas — professional law, dissenting workers in labour law and 
the rights of parents and school boards are unsettled and will be litigated in the future. 
This writer is very concerned with undue deference towards professional associations 
and submits that Therrien, supra, note 36, Moreau-Bérubé, supra, note 35, Ryan, supra, 
note 86, and Dr. Q, supra, note 54, will have to be revisited soon. 
109. It would probably be best if there were no deference of questions of law of a general and 
fundamental nature. For a less critical view of the pragmatic and functional approach 
and a greater appreciation of the virtues of judicial deference than that proposed here 
see S. COMTOIS, Vers laprimauté de l’approche pragmatique et fonctionnelle : précis du 
contrôle judiciaire des décisions de fond rendues par les organismes administratifs, 
Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2003. 
